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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988) . 
This is an appeal from an Order entered by the Honorable 
George E. Ballif, Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah, on April 6, 1988, granting defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Utah Code Annotated § 75-6-112 (1975) bars 
plaintiff's recovery for Zions' failure to pay him under joint 
Certificates of Deposit, which were instead reissued at the 
direction of the owner of the Certificates of Deposit. 
2. Whether the testimony of one bank teller, in 
contravention of the testimony of all the other witnesses in the 
case, including the plaintiff, and which if believed still 
requires that the plaintiff fail to recover against Zions, 
constitutes a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to 
preclude the granting of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a legal malpractice action. Plaintiff Garth Youd 
("Youd") retained defendants to pursue an action against Zions 
First National Bank ("Zions") to recover amounts Youd claimed due 
him under two Certificates of Deposit. Judgment was entered in 
favor of Zions and against Youd, and Youd then initiated this 
action against defendants. 
Defendants admitted negligence, and the issues involved 
in this action were limited to questions of causation and damages 
— whether defendants' negligence harmed the plaintiff. 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in this 
action based upon the statutory protection Zions enjoyed against 
the very claim the plaintiff asserted — claims of improper 
payment on multiple-party Certificates of Deposit. Plaintiff 
responded by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. These 
motions were argued at the pre-trial conference. Judge Ballif 
denied plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and granted 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendants were retained by plaintiff to represent 
him in an action against Zions First National Bank ("Zions"). 
Complaint at If 4, R. 1. 
2. In connection with defendants' representation of 
plaintiff, defendants filed an action entitled Garth Youd v. Zions 
First National Bank, Civ. No. C83-1368-W, in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah (the "Zions action"). 
3. Defendant Richard B. Johnson failed to appear at a 
pre-trial conference in the Zions action, and failed to file an 
appellate brief in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit on the appeal of the Zions action. R. 112-114. 
4. Zions issued two Certificates of Deposit in the joint 
names of Wilford Youd and Garth Youd in the amounts of $10,000.00 
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and $15,000.00. Complaint in Zions Action at 1f 5, R. 50. The 
$10,000.00 Certificate matured on September 6, 1982 and the 
$15,000.00 Certificate matured on October 27, 1982. R. 177. 
5. On September 7, 1982, plaintiff took the two 
Certificates of Deposit to the Zions Spanish Fork Branch and spoke 
with Dona Jensen and Irene K. Brunson, two employees of the Zion's 
Spanish Fork Branch. Plaintiff requested that they recover the 
interest that had been paid to plaintiff's sister on the 
$10,000.00 Certificate of Deposit, roll the interest into the 
principal, and issue a new Certificate of Deposit for the 
principal and interest amount in plaintiff's name only. Once this 
was done, they were to place the new Certificate of Deposit and 
the $15,000.00 Certificate of Deposit into plaintiff's safety 
deposit box. Plaintiff was going to mail the key to the safety 
deposit box so that this could be accomplished. Garth Youd 
Deposition at pp. 70-75 and 81, R. 62-68. 
6. Plaintiff's request was not in writing. Garth Youd 
Deposition at pp. 75 and 81, R. 67-68. 
7. On September 7, 1982, Richard B. Roach, Manager of 
Zion's Spanish Fork Branch, spoke with Dona Jensen and Irene K. 
Brunson regarding plaintiff's request. Richard B. Roach 
Deposition at pp. 36-44, R. 71-79. 
8. On September 7, 1982, Richard B. Roach met with Leona 
Warner, daughter of Wilford Youd, who informed him that Wilford 
was concerned about his money, that the family was concerned about 
medical expenses Wilford might incur, and that it was not the time 
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to be dividing up money among children. Roach Deposition at 
pp. 38-40, R. 73-75. 
9. On September 7, 1982, Wilford Youd directed 
Richard B. Roach to have the Certificates of Deposit taken out of 
Wilford and Garth's names and placed in the names of Wilford and 
his two daughters, Leona Warner and LaRaine Mackley. Roach 
Deposition at pp. 42-44, R. 77-79. 
10. Richard Roach complied with Wilford Youd's 
request. Roach Deposition at p. 44, R. 79. 
11. Garth Youd did not pay anything for the Certificates 
of Deposit involved in this action. Youd Deposition at p. 57, 
R. 149. 
12. Dona Jensen testified that on two occasions she 
reissued Certificates in the name of Garth Youd and returned the 
new Certificates to Youd before he left the bank. Dona Jensen 
Deposition at pp. 14-17, R. 137-140. 
13. Zions First National Bank has a practice and 
procedure of reissuing Certificates of Deposit, including changing 
the names on the Certificate, without endorsement. Roach 
Deposition at p. 47, R. 151. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order to prevail in an action for legal malpractice, 
the plaintiff must establish all elements of the cause of action. 
Failure to prove causation or damages bars recovery despite an 
admission of negligence on the part of the defendants. Youd is 
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barred by law from recovering against Zions and therefore has no 
damages, so summary judgment in defendants' favor is proper. 
The $15,000.00 Certificate of Deposit was not mature, was 
not presented for payment, and could not be paid to Youd on 
September 7, 1982. The fact that the owner of the Certificate, 
Wilford Youd, later chose to have the Certificate reissued without 
Garth Youd•s name on it does not give rise to a cause of action by 
Garth Youd against Zions. Youd could not recover under any theory 
with respect to the $15,000 Certificate. The issues in this case 
are properly limited to the disposition of the $10,000.00 
Certificate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-112 provides an absolute discharge 
of any claims Youd could assert against Zions concerning the 
disposition of the $10,000.00 Certificate. Zions received 
instructions from both named beneficiaries, and chose to honor the 
Certificate's owner's instructions. This section discharges Zions 
from any liability for making that decision. 
Similarly, there is no genuine issue of material fact 
concerning the reissuance of the $10,000.00 Certificate. Youd now 
attempts to create an issue of fact by relying upon the testimony 
of a Zions' employee who claimed that she had reissued a 
certificate in Youd's name and given it back to him before he left 
the bank. It is not clear that this testimony refers to the 
Certificate involved in this case. If it does, it is contradicted 
by Youd's own testimony as well as by the testimony of the other 
Zions' employees. Even assuming as we must that the employee's 
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testimony is true, Zions would still be entitled to summary 
judgment because Youd would have had the $10,000.00 Certificate in 
his possession and issued in his name alone, and no claim that 
Zions had not followed his directions could arise. The trial 
judge properly found that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact concerning this issue. 
Plaintiff's reliance on the presentment provisions of the 
U.C.C. and those contained in the Certificates of Deposit is also 
misplaced. As noted above, the $15,000.00 Certificate was not 
mature and not eligible for payment or presentment at the time 
Youd was in the bank. The $10,000.00 Certificate was mature, but 
Youd did not request present payment. Rather, he instructed the 
bank to recover the interest it had paid on the Certificate to 
Youd's sisters and to issue a new Certificate in his name alone 
for the current principal plus the interest recovered. Since 
there was no presentment for payment, the U.C.C. provisions upon 
which plaintiff relies are not applicable, nor are the provisions 
of the Certificate of Deposit quoted by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's claim that Zions violated a bailment he 
created concerning the Certificates of Deposit is without merit. 
The duty of a bailee also runs to the true owner of the property. 
It is undisputed that under Utah law, Youd's father, Wilford Youd, 
was the owner of both Certificates of Deposit. Zions' actions of 
which plaintiff complains were merely to carry out the wishes of 
Youd's father, Wilford Youd, in reissuing the Certificates in the 
name of Wilford Youd and the plaintiff's sisters, Leona Warner and 
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LaRaine Mackey. Zions had no duty running to the plaintiff which 
superceded its duty owed to the owner, Wilford Youd. 
Zions* actions do not subject it to liability to the 
plaintiff. Accordingly, Zions would have prevailed in the 
original federal district court action and defendants' negligence 
in representing the plaintiff did not cause plaintiff any damage. 
For these reasons, the Court's ruling of summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants is proper and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF MUST ESTABLISH ALL ELEMENTS OF A LEGAL MALPRACTICE 
CLAIM TO PREVAIL. 
The plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must prove 
each and every one of the following elements in order to establish 
the cause of action: 
1. That an attorney-client relationship existed; 
2. That the attorney had a duty to the client; 
3. That the attorney failed to perform the duty; 
4. That the client suffered damages; and 
5. That the attorney's negligence proximately caused 
the damage to the client. 
Stanqland v. Brock, 109 Wash.2d 675, 747 P.2d 464 (1987); Phillips 
v. Clancey, 152 Ariz. 415, 733 P.2d 300 (Ct. App. 1986); Chocktoot 
v. Smith, 280 Or. 567, 571 P.2d 1255 (1977); R. Mallen and 
V. Levit, Legal Malpractice, § 657 (2d Ed. 1981) (hereinafter 
referred to as "Legal Malpractice"). 
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In a case such as this, where the alleged error is an 
omission, the test of causation is: Had the attorney performed 
the act, would the plaintiff have benefited? Dunn v. McKay, 
Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 895 (Utah 1978) 
(appropriate to inquire as to what the plaintiffs position would 
have been if the attorney had performed the act properly); see 
also Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686, 689 (1968); 
Legal Malpractice, § 102. This inquiry is referred to as "a suit 
within a suit." Chocktoot v. Smith, 571 P.2d at 1257. 
In this case, there is no dispute concerning the 
existence of the attorney-client relationship and defendants have 
admitted that they were negligent in representing the plaintiff in 
the underlying action. Therefore, the plaintiff must establish 
the final elements of damages and causation in order to recover in 
this case. These elements are established by examining the "suit 
within a suit" and what would have hapened if the federal district 
court action had been decided on the merits. 
The manner in which the plaintiff can establish what 
should have transpired in the underlying action necessarily 
depends upon the nature of the attorney's error. If the action 
never took place, as where it was barred by a statute of 
limitations or concluded by a default judgment, as in this case, 
the plaintiff will be required to recreate, i.e., litigate, an 
action which was never tried. Legal Malpractice § 656. 
Recreating the underlying action involves 
calling and examining those persons who would 
have been parties and witnesses and presenting 
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the demonstrative and documentary evidence which 
would have been presented but for the attorney's 
negligence. This procedure of presenting the 
evidence which should have been offered at the 
trial of the underlying action is known as a 
•suit within a suit* or 'trial within a trial.' 
This is the accepted and traditional means of 
resolving issues involved in the underlying 
proceedings in a legal malpractice action. 
Id. See Kessler v. Gray, 77 Cal. App. 3d 284, 143 Cal. Rptr. 496 
(Ct. App. 1978); Michael Kovach, P.A. v. Pearce, 427 So. 2d 1128, 
1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), pet, den., 434 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 
1983); Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 319 A.2d 781, 
785 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974); Lewandowski v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 88 Wis. 2d 271, 276 N.W. 2d 284, 289 (1979). In 
other words, the client must show that he would have won the first 
suit as one step in order to win the second one. Harding v. Bell, 
265 Or. 202, 508 P.2d 216, 217 (1973). 
II. PLAINTIFF CAN OBTAIN NO RECOVERY AGAINST ZIONS AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, AND THEREFORE, PLAINTIFF IS UNABLE TO ESTABLISH EITHER 
CAUSATION OR DAMAGES. 
In the Zions action, plaintiff claimed that he and his 
father, Wilford Youd, were the named payees of two Certificates of 
Deposit issued by Zions in the amount of $15,000.00 and $10,000.00, 
respectively. Plaintiff testified that on September 7, 1982, he 
took the two Certificates of Deposit to Zions' Spanish Fork Branch 
and instructed Zions to recover the interest on the $10,000.00 
Certificate of Deposit, roll the interest into the principal, and 
issue a new Certificate of Deposit in the plaintiff's name. Then 
Zions was to place the new Certificate of Deposit and the 
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(unmatured) $15,000.00 Certificate of Deposit into plaintiff's 
safety deposit box. Garth Youd Deposition at pp. 70-75/ 
R. 62-67. Plaintiff claimed in the Zions action that Zions failed 
to follow his instructions and acted wrongfully in reissuing the 
Certificates of Deposit in the names of his father and his two 
sisters. 
Zions had an absolute defense to the claims asserted by 
plaintiff in the Zions action. 
A. The Certificates of Deposit Were "Multiple-Party 
Accounts" Under Utah Law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(1) defines "account" as follows: 
"Account" means a contract of deposit of funds 
between a depositor and a financial institution and 
includes a checking account, savings account, 
certificate of deposit, share account and other 
like arrangement. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(4) defines "joint account" as 
follows: 
"Joint account" means an account payable on 
request to one or more of two or more parties 
whether or not mention is made of any right of 
survivorship. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(5) defines "multiple-party 
account" to include joint accounts as defined under § 75-6-101(4). 
Under the terms of § 75-6-101(1), (4) and (5), the 
Certificates of Deposit issued by Zions to plaintiff and his 
father were multiple-party accounts. 
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B. Zions' Conduct Discharges It from Liability for 
Plaintiff's Claim in the Zions Action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-108 provides: 
Financial institutions may enter into 
multiple-party accounts to the same extent that 
they may enter into single-party accounts. Any 
multiple-party account may be paid, on request of 
any one or more of the parties. A financial 
institution shall not be required to inquire as to 
the source of funds received for deposit to a 
multiple-party account or to inquire as to the 
proposed application of any sum withdrawn from an 
account, for purposes of establishing net 
contributions. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-112 provides in pertinent part: 
Payment made pursuant to Section 75-6-108 
. . . discharges the financial institution from 
all claims for amounts so paid whether or not the 
payment is consistent with the beneficial 
ownership of the account as between parties 
. . . . The protection here given does not extend 
to payments made after a financial institution has 
received written notice from any party able to 
request present payment to the effect that 
withdrawals in accordance with the terms of the 
account should not be permitted. Unless the 
notice is withdrawn by the person giving it, the 
successor of any deceased party must concur in any 
demand for withdrawal if the financial institution 
is to be protected under this section. No other 
notice or any other information shown to have been 
available to a financial institution shall affect 
its right to the protection provided here. The 
protection here provided shall have no bearing on 
the rights of parties in disputes between 
themselves or their successors concerning the 
beneficial ownership of funds in, or withdrawn 
from, multiple party accounts. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
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Only one Utah case has discussed the aforementioned 
statutory provisions. In Smith v. Utah Central Credit Union, 727 
P.2d 219 (Utah 1986), the plaintiff brought an action to recover 
funds deposited to a joint savings account and withdrawn by his 
wife. The plaintiff alleged that the credit union failed to honor 
his telephone request that no money be withdrawn by his wife 
without his approval. The trial court entered judgment against 
plaintiff. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court cited the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-6-108 and 75-6-112 and affirmed the 
judgment against the plaintiff, relieving the credit union of 
liability and stating that the plaintiffs oral statements to the 
credit union were not "written notice" under § 75-6-112. Here 
plaintiff complains that his oral instructions to Zions were not 
followed, and that Zions' reissuance of the Certificates at 
Wilford Youd's request entitles him to recovery. Just as in 
Smith, the financial institution's actions should be protected and 
j udgment af f i rmed. 
In plaintiff's deposition taken in the Zions action, 
plaintiff admitted that his instructions to Zions were oral. 
Garth Youd deposition at pp. 72-75, R. 64-67. Therefore, there is 
no possible way the exception in § 75-6-112 concerning receipt of 
written notice from any party "able to request present payment" 
applies. No written notice was given, and Youd's own testimony 
shows that in any event his instructions were not to refuse 
"withdrawals in accordance with the terms of the account," and so 
would not trigger the exception. 
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In the Zions action, Richard B. Roach, Branch Manager of 
Zions, testified that on September 7, 1982, he had a conversation 
with Dona Jensen and Irene K. Brunson, two employees of Zions, who 
informed him of plaintiff's requests. He further testified, that 
on that same day, he was contacted by Leona Warner, the daughter 
of Wilford Youd, who told him that the family was concerned about 
medical expenses Wilford Youd might incur later in life and that 
that was not the time to be dividing his money among the children. 
She also told him that Wilford Youd was concerned about what was 
happening with his money. Mr. Roach asked Leona to have Wilford 
Youd call him. On September 7, Wilford Youd telephoned Mr. Roach 
who told him about Garth's request. In response, Wilford Youd 
told Mr. Roach to take Garth's name off of the Certificates of 
Deposit, and to have the Certificates of Deposit reissued in 
Wilford Youd's name and the names of his two daughters. Richard 
Roach Deposition at pp. 36-45, R. 71-80. Zions complied with the 
request of Wilford Youd, and reissued the Certificates of Deposit 
in his name and the names of his two daughters. 
Under § 75-6-108, Zions had the right to follow the 
instructions of Wilford Youd. Section 75-6-112 discharges Zions 
from all of plaintiff's claims for following the request of 
Wilford Youd. 
C. Wilford Youd's Request for Reissuance of the Certificate 
of Deposit was a "Proper Request". 
Plaintiff argues that Wilford Youd's telephone 
instructions to Richard Roach do not constitute a "request" as 
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defined in Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-101(12), and so Zions cannot 
enjoy the protection of § 75-6-112. Appellant's Brief at 29-31. 
Section 75-6-101(12) defines a request to be: 
A proper request for withdrawal, or a check or 
order for payment, which complies with all 
conditions of the account, including special 
requirements concerning necessary signatures and 
regulations of the financial institution . . . . 
Wilford Youd requested Zions to reissue the two Certificates of 
Deposit in his name and the names of his two daughters. Roach 
Deposition, pp. 42-44, R. 77-79. Zions complied with that 
request. The Certificates of Deposit do not specify any 
conditions for their reissuance, and plaintiff has failed to 
establish that any conditions for reissuance exist under the terms 
of the Certificates, or under any laws or regulations concerning 
financial institutions. Zions had a practice and procedure 
permitting a party to a joint account to orally request the change 
of the names on the account, without endorsement. Roach 
Deposition, pp. 47-48, R. 151-152. Zions followed Wilford Youd*s 
request based on this policy and procedure. Id.. Therefore, 
Wilford Youd's request met all the "conditions of the account" as 
required by § 75-6-101(12) and was a proper request, entitling 
Zions to the protection of § 75-6-112. 
Section 75-6-112 protects a financial institution from 
claims for not dividing up the proceeds of a joint account 
according to its beneficial ownership. Here Zions was faced with 
conflicting claims by each named payee. It could have thrown up 
its hands and paid the money into court. The court then would 
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have looked to who provided the funds, i.e., who was the owner of 
the account pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-103(1), and decided 
in favor of the owner, Wilford Youd. Zions should not and cannot 
be held liable for coming to the same conclusion a court would 
have. 
III. THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT CONCERNING THE 
REISSUANCE OF THE $10,000.00 CERTIFICATE. 
In plaintiff's Appeal Brief he claims that the district 
court erred in not finding that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning the alleged reissuance of the $10,000.00 
Certificate in his name alone. It is interesting to note that 
while the plaintiff did mention the testimony which supports this 
claim below, he argued instead for summary judgment in his favor 
and that there were no genuine issues of material fact. 
Plaintiff's claim that there is a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether the $10,000.00 Certificate was reissued in his name 
alone is based upon the testimony of Dona Jensen. Deposition of 
Dona Jensen at pp. 14-17, R. 137-140. Her testimony was that on 
two separate occasions Youd came into the bank with a certificate 
of deposit of $10,000.00 or more and requested that the interest 
be added to the principal and a new certificate be issued in his 
name alone. Jensen testified that on both occasions she reissued 
the new certificate, handed it to Youd, who then left the bank. 
She also testified that sometime after these two certificates had 
been reissued, she was advised by Richard Roach, the branch 
manager, that he had talked to Wilford Youd and that a problem had 
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come up about some Certificates of Deposit. Jensen Depo. 
pp. 22-24. There is nothing to connect the certificates she 
discusses with those involved in this action. According to the 
testimony of all the other players involved, including the 
plaintiff, he brought both Certificates in on the same day, only 
one of which was mature and able to be cashed. He left the 
Certificates with Zions with instructions to recover the interest 
on the $10,000.00 Certificate and only then reissue it in a new 
amount, including the interest, in his name alone. Later that 
same day, the bank was contacted by Wilford Youd and given 
different instructions. 
Plaintiff's attempt to create an issue of fact is a red 
herring. If Ms. Jensen's testimony refers to these Certificates 
of Deposit and is correct, then Youd left the bank with reissued 
Certificates of Deposit in his name alone. If this is the case, 
the Zions action would never have been filed since he had the 
Certificates to do with as he pleased. Zions could not have 
reissued the Certificates again after they had been given to 
Youd. Ms. Jensen's testimony is not at all specific as to the 
date these events occurred, except that it was prior to her 
conversation with Richard Roach concerning his conversation with 
Wilford Youd. When asked what Roach told her to do concerning the 
Certificates of Deposit, Jensen testified that as to the 
certificates she had reissued, "they were over and done with," and 
that there were "apparently other certificates." Jensen 
Deposition at pp. 23-24. 
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This does not create a genuine issue of material fact. 
If Jensen's testimony is accurate and actually refers to the 
Certificates of Deposit involved in this case, which is nowhere 
indicated in her testimony, this action would not exist. If the 
testimony refers to other certificates of deposit she reissued for 
plaintiff, her testimony is of no relevance to Zions actions with 
respect to these two Certificates of Deposit. Plaintiffs 
testimony regarding what he did with the two Certificates involved 
in this action was that he spoke to Dona Jensen and Irene Bronson, 
but that he talked Irene and gave her (not Dona) instructions 
concerning what to do with the Certificates of Deposit. Youd's 
Deposition at pp. 72-74, R. 125-127. 
The trial court properly concluded that Ms. Jensen's 
testimony concerning reissuing new certificates of deposit and 
delivering them to Garth Youd did not raise a genuine issue of 
material fact in this case. If Ms. Jensen's testimony is correct, 
Youd received a reissued Certificate of Deposit and Zions did not 
act improperly; plaintiff has no claim. If her testimony is not 
correct, Zions is protected by Utah law in its decision to honor 
the wishes of the owner of the Certificates of Deposit, and is not 
liable to the plaintiff. Either way, summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants is appropriate. As Professor Moore states, "[t]he 
function of the summary judgment is to avoid a useless 
trial. ..." 6 Moore's Federal Practice If 56.15 [1.-0] (2d Ed. 
1988). A trial over this issue (the only issue plaintiff even 
attempts to argue is disputed) would indeed be useless — no 
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matter the decision regarding Ms. Jensen's testimony, plaintiff 
cannot recover against Zions. 
To successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, a 
party's facts "must be material and of a substantial nature, not 
fanciful, frivolous, gauzy, spurious, irrelevant, gossamer infer-
ences, conjectural, speculative, nor merely suspicions." 6 Moore's 
Federal Practice 1f 56.15 [3] (2d Ed. 1988). While defendants 
hesitate to categorize plaintiff's alleged issue of fact, its 
determination is of no influence on the outcome of this action and 
should not be considered a genuine issue of material fact. 
IV. NO PRESENTMENT WAS MADE AND THEREFORE THE U.C.C. PROVISIONS 
AND TERMS OF THE CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT CONCERNING 
PRESENTMENT DO NOT APPLY. 
It is undisputed that the $15,000.00 Certificate was not 
mature on September 7, 1982, and therefore, Youd could not have 
presented it for payment. Similarly, Zions cannot be liable for 
dishonor of presentment for that Certificate. It is also 
undisputed that Youd did not present the $10,000.00 Certificate 
for present payment. Rather, as he testified, he requested that 
the bank recover the interest paid on the Certificate, add the 
amount of interest to the principal, and reissue a new certificate 
in his name alone. Youd Deposition at pp. 72-77, R. 125-129. 
Since plaintiff did not request present payment of the 
Certificates, the U.C.C. provisions and provisions of the 
Certificate relied upon by the plaintiff are not relevant or 
dispositive in this case. 
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It is clear under the U.C.C. that presentment requires a 
demand for present payment. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-504(1). For 
example, in Bank of Miami v. Banco Industrial Y Ganadero Del Beni, 
S.A., 515 So. 2d 1038, 1040, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1522 (Fla. 
App. 1987), review dismissed, 520 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1988), the 
court held that submitting a check for collection (i.e., payable 
if and when sufficient funds are deposited in the drawer's account 
to cover the amount of the check, is not "presentment" within the 
meaning of § 3-504, because it is not a "present demand for 
payment." See also, Western Air & Refrigeration, Inc. v. Metro 
Bank, 599 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir. 1979) (check presented for 
collection is not presentment); Iverson v. First Bank of Billings, 
712 P.2d 1285 (Mont. 1985) (check sent to payor bank for payment 
once funds become available to pay it not presented under § 3-504). 
In this case plaintiff never made a demand for present 
payment. Rather, he requested that Zions hold the Certificate 
until it recovered the interest it had paid on it and then issue a 
new Certificate in his name alone for the new total, including 
both the old principal and the interest. This type of arrangement 
is not a present demand for payment and not a presentment within 
the meaning of § 70A-3-504. Without presentment, plaintiff's 
arguments concerning Zions' refusal to make payment, appellant's 
Brief at pp. 24-29, are not relevant to this case. 
The only question is whether there are any provisions of 
law or contractual provisions which permit names on joint accounts 
to be changed by one of the payees. No such law or contractual 
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provisions have been presented by the plaintiff or located by the 
defendants. In this case, Zions received conflicting instructions 
on the same day from both named payees. It chose to follow the 
instructions given by Wilford Youd, the owner of the 
Certificates.1 
Since plaintiff did not present the Certificates for 
present payment, Zions could not have and is not liable for 
dishonored presentment of the Certificates. 
V. ZIONS IS NOT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF AS A BAILEE. 
There is no evidence that in receiving the two Certifi-
cates from Garth Youd, Zions agreed to follow his instructions. As 
a result, there is nothing to indicate the acceptance of a 
bailment by Zions. However, even if we assume that a bailor-
bailee relationship existed between Garth Youd and Zions, Zions 
would not have been liable to Garth Youd. 
It is generally accepted that delivery of property 
subject to a bailment to the true owner, in good faith, is a valid 
defense to an action brought by the bailor against the bailee. 
See 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Bailments, §§ 194-197. It is also recognized 
that the bailee's obligations run to the paramount titleholder as 
2Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-103(1) provides that a joint account belongs, 
during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net 
contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless there is clear and 
convincing evidence of a different intent. In this case, it is undisputed that 
all of the funds for both Certificates of Deposit were provided by Wilford Youd. 
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well as to the bailor. See, Christensen v. Hoover, 44 Colo. App. 
501, 608 P.2d 372, 374, (1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on 
other grounds, 643 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1982). 
As set forth above, § 75-6-103(1) provides that as 
between the parties on joint accounts, the account belongs to the 
parties in proportion to their contributions. In the Zions 
action, Wilford Youd was the owner of the Certificates by 
application of § 75-6-103(1). It is undisputed that Zions 
understood the ownership rights to the Certificates consistently 
with the provisions of § 75-6-103(1), and based on that 
understanding followed the instructions of Wilford Youd. Richard 
Roach Depo. pp. 44-45, R. 79-80. In following the instructions of 
the owner, Wilford Youd, Zions incurs no liability to Garth Youd. 
Zions cannot be liable to plaintiff for conversion since 
it did not retain the Certificates or obtain any benefit from 
them, but rather disposed of them in accordance with the wishes of 
the true owner of the Certificates, Wilford Youd. 
VI. IN NO EVENT CAN PLAINTIFF RECOVER CONCERNING THE $15,000.00 
CERTIFICATE. 
It is undisputed that the $15,000.00 Certificate was not 
mature at the time Youd brought the Certificates to the bank. He 
could not present it for payment, nor could he request payment, or 
even provide written notice as a "party able to request present 
payment" pursuant to § 76-5-112. Therefore, under none of the 
theories advanced by the plaintiff could Zions have become liable 
for its actions concerning the $15,000.00 Certificate or its 
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reissuance of that Certificate in the names of Wilford Youd and the 
plaintiff's sisters. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff must establish that he was damaged and that his 
damage was caused by the defendants' negligence. In this case, 
plaintiff did not suffer any damage caused by the defendants* 
negligence because he could not, as a matter of law, have recovered 
from Zions. Zions' actions were protected by Utah statute. 
Wilford Youd's request to reissue the Certificates in his name and 
those of his daughters was proper and the bank's decision to honor 
that request may not subject it to claims by plaintiff. Plaintiff 
did not present the Certificates of Deposit for present payment, 
and so Plaintiff's claims of dishonored presentment or breach of 
contract are not applicable. Similarly, plaintiff's attempt to 
manufacture a genuine issue of material fact fails. If the 
testimony upon which plaintiff relies is determined to actually 
apply to the Certificates of Deposit involved in this case, then 
plaintiff does not have a claim, since Zions followed his 
instructions. If the testimony does not refer to these 
Certificates or is not accurate, then the bank's actions were 
protected by statute. Either way, plaintiff cannot recover against 
Zions. There is no genuine issue of material fact when either 
resolution of the issue will end up with the same outcome. 
Plaintiff was unable to obtain the funds from the 
Certificates of Deposit purchased by his father. Zions, however, 
acted properly and is not subject to liability to plaintiff, 
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because the trial court was correct in determining that Zions was 
protected by Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-112 in its determination to 
reissue the Certificates as requested by Wilford Youd. Therefore, 
plaintiff was barred from recovering against Zions and accordingly 
suffered no damages in this case. Summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant is proper and the district court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1988. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Thomas L. ^Cay 
Steven J. Aeschbacher 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
2825a 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNTS 75-6-101 
and, if the custodian is removed, shall so require and order delivery of 
all custodial property to the successor custodian and the execution of 
all instruments required for the transfer thereof. 
History: C. 1953, 75-5-608, enacted by 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 6. 
75-5-609. Construction of this part.— (1) This part shall be so con-
strued as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of 
those states which have enacted the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. 
(2) This part shall not be construed as providing an exclusive meth-
od for making gifts to minors. 
History: C. 1953, 75-5-609, enacted by 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 6. 
CHAPTER 6 
NONPROBATE TRANSFERS 
Part L Multiple-Party Accounts 
Section 
75-6-101. Definitions. 
75-6-102. Ownership as between parties, and others—Protection of financial insti-
tutions. 
75-6-103. Ownership during lifetime. 
75-6-104. Right of survivorship. 
75-6-105. Effect of written notice to financial institution. 
75-6-106. Accounts and transfers nontestamentary. 
75-6-107. Rights of creditors. 
75-6-108. Financial institution protection—Payment on signature of one party. 
75-6-109. Financial institution protection—Payment after death or disability— 
Joint account 
75-6-110. Financial institution protection—Payment of P.O.D. account. 
76-6-111. Financial institution protection—Payment of trust account. 
75-6-112. Financial institution protection—Discharge. 
75-6-113. Financial institution protection—Setoff—Attachment, garnishment, and 
other legal process. 
75-6-114. Financial institution protection—Costs and attorneys' fees. 
75-6-115. Agency accounts. 
Part 2. Provisions Relating to Effect on Death 
75-6-201. Provisions for payment or transfer at death. 
P a r t i 
Multiple-Party Accounts 
75-6-101. Definitions.—As used in this part: 
(1) "Account" means a contract of deposit of funds between a de-
positor and a financial institution and includes a checking account, sav-
ings account, certificate of deposit, share account, and other like ar-
rangement. 
(2) "Beneficiary" means a person named in a trust account as one 
for whom a party to the account is named as trustee. 
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(3) "Financial institution" means any organization authorized to do 
business under state or federal laws relating to financial institutions, in-
cluding, without limitation, banks and trust companies, industrial loan 
corporations with thrift certificate authorization, savings banks, build-
ing and loan associations, savings and loan companies or associations, 
and credit unions. 
(4) "Joint account" means an account payable on request to one or 
more of two or more parties whether or not mention is made of any right 
of survivorship. 
(5) "Multiple-party account" means any of the following types of 
account: (a) A joint account; (b) A P.O.D. account; or (c) A trust 
account. It does not include accounts established for deposit of funds of a 
partnership, joint venture, or other association for business purposes, or 
accounts controlled by one or more persons as the duly authorized agent 
or trustee for a corporation, unincorporated association, charitable or 
civic organization, or a regular fiduciary or trust account where the rela-
tionship is established other than by deposit agreement. 
(6) "Net contribution" of a party to a joint account as of any given 
time is the sum of all deposits to it made by or for him, less all with-
drawals made by or for him wrhich have not been paid to or applied to 
the use of any other party, plus a prorata share of any interest or divi-
dends included in the current balance. The term includes, in addition, 
any proceeds of deposit life insurance added to the account by reason of 
the death of the party whose net contribution is in question. 
(7) "Party" means a person, including a minor, who, by the terms 
of the account, has a present right, subject to request, to payment from 
a multiple-party account. A P.O.D. payee or beneficiary of a trust ac-
count is a party only after the account becomes payable to him by 
reason of his surviving the original payee or trustee and includes a 
guardian, conservator, personal representative, or assignee, including an 
attaching creditor, of a party. It also includes a person identified as a 
trustee of an account for another whether or not a beneficiary is named, 
but it does not include any named beneficiary unless he has a present 
right of withdrawal. 
(8) 'Tayment" of sums on deposit includes withdrawal, payment on 
check or other directive of a party, and any pledge of sums on deposit 
by a party and any setoff, reduction, or other disposition of all or part 
of an account pursuant to a pledge. 
(9) "Proof of death" includes a death certificate or record or report 
which is prima facie proof of death under section 75-1-107, 
(10) "P.O.D. account" means an account payable on request to one 
person during lifetime and on his death to one or more P.O.D. payees, 
or to one or more persons during their lifetimes and on the death of all 
of them to one or more P.O.D. payees. 
(11) "P.O J), payee" means a person designated on a P.O.D. account 
as one to whom the account is payable on request after the death of one 
or more persons. 
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(12) "Request" means a proper request for withdrawal, or a check 
or order for pajinent, which complies with all conditions of the account, 
including special requirements concerning necessary signatures and 
regulations of the financial institution; but if the financial institution 
conditions withdrawal or payment on advance notice, for purposes of 
this part the request for withdrawal or payment is treated as immedi-
ately effective and a notice of intent to withdraw is treated as a request 
for withdrawal. 
(13) "Sums on deposit" means the balance payable on a multiple-
party account, including interest, dividends, and in addition any deposit 
life insurance proceeds added to the account by reason of the death of 
a party. 
(14) "Trust account" means an account in the name of one or more 
parties as trustee for one or more beneficiaries where the relationship 
is established by the form of the account and the deposit agreement with 
the financial institution and there is no subject of the trust other than 
the sums on deposit in the account; and it is not essential that payment 
to the beneficiary be mentioned in the deposit agreement. A trust ac-
count does not include a regular trust account under a testamentary 
trust or a trust agreement which has significance apart from the ac-
count, or a fiduciary account arising from a fiduciary relation such as 
attorney-client. 
(15) "Withdrawal" includes payment to a third person pursuant to 
check or other directive of a party. 
History: C. 1953, 75-6-101, enacted by 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7. 
Editorial Board Comment, 
This and the sections which follow are 
designed to reduce certain questions con-
cerning many forms of joint accounts 
and the so-called Totten Trust account. 
An account "payable on death" is also 
authorized. 
As may be seen from examination 
of the sections that follow, "net con-
tribution" as defined by subsection (6) 
has no application to the financial insti-
tution-depositor relationship. Rather, it 
is relevant only to controversies that 
may arise between parties to a multiple-
party account. 
Various signature requirements may 
be involved in order to meet the with-
drawal requirements of the account. A 
"request" involves compliance with these 
requirements. A "party" is one to whom 
an account is presently payable without 
regard for whose signature may be re-
quired for a "request." 
Cross-References. 
Bank deposits in name of fiduciary or 
principal, 22-1-7 to 22-1-11. 
Collateral References. 
Banks and Bankinge=>129, 134, 138, 
142, 143, 301, 315 (3); Joint TenancyC=>3, 
6, 10, 14; TrustsO=>34. 
9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking §§286, 
296-308, 334, 353, 994, 998, 1003, 1057; 48 
C.J.S. Joint Tenancy §§3, 6, 13, 18; 89 
CJ.S. Trusts § 54. 
10 Am. Jur. 2d 330 et seq., Banks 
§ 369 et seq. 
Attachment: joint bank account as 
subject to attachment, garnishment, or 
execution by creditor of one of the joint 
depositors, 11 A. L. R. 3d 1465. 
Bank's right to apply or set off de-
posit against debt of depositor not due at 
time of his death, 7 A. L. R. 3d 908. 
Bank's right to apply third person's 
funds, deposited in debtor's name, on 
debtor's obligation, 8 A. L. R. 3d 235. 
Death of beneficiary as terminating or 
revoking trust of savings bank account 
over which settlor retains rights of with-
drawal or revocation, 64 A. L. R. 3d 221. 
Fingerprints as signature on instru-
ment purporting to create joint tenancy, 
72 A. L. R. 2d 1268. 
Gift to survivor, creation of joint sav-
ings account or savings certificate as, 43 
A. L. R. 3d 971. 
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written agreement or contract by show- of the verity accorded written instru-
ing that because of fraud, duress, undue ments, its effect can be overcome only 
influence, mistake, incapacity or other by clear and convincing evidence. Pagano 
infirmity that in equity and good con- v. Walker, 539 P. 2d 452 (4-1 decision), 
science it should not be enforced; because 
75-6-102. Ownership as between parties, and others—Protection of 
financial institutions.—The provisions of sections 75-6-103 through 75-6-
105 concerning beneficial ownership as between parties, or as between 
parties and P.O.D. payees or beneficiaries of multiple-party accounts, are 
relevant only to controversies between these persons and their creditors 
and other successors, and have no bearing on the power of withdrawal of 
these persons as determined by the terms of account contracts. The 
provisions of sections 75-6-108 through 75-6-113 govern the liability of 
financial institutions who make payments pursuant thereto, and their 
setoff rights. 
History: C. 1953, 75-6-102, enacted by opportunity for individuals involved in 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7. multiple-party accounts to show various 
i?.r* T> ^ intentions that may have attended the 
Editorial Board Comment. original deposit, or any unusual transac-
This section organizes the sections tions affecting the account thereafter, 
which follow into those dealing with the The separation thus permits individuals 
relationship between parties to multiple- using accounts of the type dealt with by 
party accounts, on the one hand, and these sections to avoid unconsidered and 
those relating to the financial institution- unwanted definiteness in regard to their 
depositor (or party) relationship, on the relationship with each other. In a sense, 
other. By keeping these relationships the approach is to implement a layman's 
separate, it is possible to achieve the wish to "trust" a co-depositor by leaving 
degree of definiteness that financial insti- questions that may arise between them 
tutions must have in order to be induced essentially unaffected by the form of the 
to offer multiple-party accounts for use account, 
by their customers, while preserving the 
75-6-103. Ownership during lifetime.—(1) A joint account belongs, 
during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net 
contributions by each to the sums on deposit, unless there is clear and 
convincing evidence of a different intent. 
(2) A P.O.D. account belongs to the original payee during his life-
time and not to the P.O.D. payee or payees; if two or more parties are 
named as original payees, during their lifetimes rights as between them 
are governed by subsection (1) of this section. 
(3) Unless a contrary intent is manifested by the terms of the ac-
count or the deposit agreement or there is other clear and convincing 
evidence of an irrevocable trust, a trust account belongs beneficially to 
the trustee during his lifetime, and if two or more parties are named as 
trustee on the account, during their lifetimes beneficial rights as between 
them are governed by subsection (1) of this section. If there is an irrev-
ocable trust, the account belongs beneficially to the beneficiary. 
History: C. 1953, 75-6-103, enacted by multiple-party account normally does 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7. not intend to make an irrevocable gift 
__ . of all or any part of the funds repre-
Editonal Board Comment. sented by the deposit. Bather, he usually 
. This section reflects the assumption intends no present change of beneficial 
that a person who deposits funds in a ownership. The assumption may be dis-
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written demand by a surviving spouse, a creditor, or one acting for a 
minor or dependent child of the decedent; and no proceeding shall be 
commenced later than two years following the death of the decedent. 
Sums recovered by the personal representative shall be administered as 
part of the decedent's estate. This section shall not affect the right of a 
financial institution to make payment on multiple-party accounts accord-
ing to the terms thereof or make it liable to the estate of a deceased 
party unless before payment the institution has been served with process 
in a proceeding by the personal representative. 
History. C. 1953, 75-6-107, enacted by multiple-party account if the probate 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7. estate is insolvent; rights are limited, 
-CU- • T> J ^ however, to sums needed for statutorv 
Editorial Board Comment. allowances. The phrase "statutory al-
The sections of this chapter authorize lowances" includes the homestead al-
transfers a t death which reduce the lowance under section 75-2-401, the 
estate to which the surviving spouse, family allowance under section 75-2-403, 
creditors and minor children normally and any allowance needed to make up 
must look for protection against a dece- the deficiency in exempt property under 
dent's gifts by will. Accordingly, it section 75-2-402. In any case (including 
seemed desirable to provide a remedy to a solvent estate) the surviving spouse 
these classes of persons which should could proceed under section 75-2-201 et 
assure them that multiple-party accounts seq. to claim an elective share in the 
cannot be used to reduce the essential account if the deposits by the decedent 
protection they would be entitled to if satisfy the requirements of section 75-
such accounts were deemed a special 2-202 so that the account falls within the 
form of specific devise. Under this sec- augmented net estate concept. In the 
tion a surviving spouse is automatically latter situation the spouse is not pro-
assured of some protection against a ceeding as a creditor under this section. 
75-6-108. Financial institution protection—Payment on signature of 
one party.—Financial institutions may enter into multiple-party ac-
counts to the same extent that they may enter into single-party accounts. 
Any multiple-party account may be paid, on request, to any one or more 
of the parties. A financial institution shall not be required to inquire 
as to the source of funds received for deposit to a multiple-party ac-
count, or to inquire as to the proposed application of any sum withdrawn 
from an account, for purposes of establishing net contributions. 
History: C. 1953, 75-6-108, enacted by 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7. 
75-6-109. Financial institution protection—Payment after death or 
disability—Joint account.—Any sums in a joint account may be paid, on 
request, to. any party without regard to whether any other party is in-
capacitated or deceased at the time the payment is demanded; but 
payment may not be made to the personal representative or heirs of a de-
ceased party unless proofs of death are presented to the financial institu-
tion showing that the decedent was the last surviving party or unless 
there is no right of survivorship under section 75-6-104. 
History: C. 1953, 75-6-109, enacted by 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7. 
75-6-110. Financial institution protection—Payment of P.O.D. ac-
count.—Any P.O.D. account may be paid, on request, to any original 
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party to the account. Payment may be made, on request, to the P.O.D. 
payee or to the personal representative or heirs of a deceased P.O.D. 
payee upon presentation to the financial institution of proof of death 
showing that the P.O.D. payee survived all persons named as original 
payees. Payment may be made to the personal representative or heirs 
of a deceased original payee if proof of death is presented to the finan-
cial institution showing that his decedent was the survivor of all other 
persons named on the account either as an original payee or as P.O.D. 
payee. 
History: C. 1953, 75-6-110, enacted by 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7. 
75-6-111. Financial institution protection—Payment of trust account. 
—Any trust account may be paid, on request, to any trustee. Unless the 
financial institution has received written notice that the beneficiary has 
a vested interest not dependent upon his surviving the trustee, payment 
may be made to the personal representative or heirs of a deceased trustee 
if proof of death is presented to the financial institution showing that his 
decedent was the survivor of all other persons named on the account 
either as trustee or beneficiary. Payment may be made, on request, to 
the beneficiary upon presentation to the financial institution of proof of 
death showing that the beneficiary or beneficiaries survived all persons 
named as trustees. 
History: C. 1953, 75-6-111, enacted by 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7. 
75-6-112. Financial institution protection — Discharge. — Payment 
made pursuant to section 75-6-108, 75-6-109, 75-6-110 or 75-6-111 dis-
charges the financial institution from all claims for amounts so paid 
whether or not the payment is consistent with the beneficial ownership 
of the account as between parties, P.O.D. payees, or beneficiaries, or 
their successors. The protection here given does not extend to pay-
ments made after a financial institution has received written notice 
from any party able to request present payment to the effect that with-
drawals in accordance with the terms of the account should not be 
permitted. Unless the notice is withdrawn by the person giving it, the 
successor of any deceased party must concur in any demand for with-
drawal if the financial institution is to be protected under this section. 
No other notice or any other information shown to have been available 
to a financial institution shall affect its right to the protection provided 
here. The protection here provided shall have no bearing on the rights 
of parties in disputes between themselves or their successors concern-
ing the beneficial ownership of funds in, or withdrawn from, multiple-
party accounts. 
History: C. 1953, 75-6-112, enacted by 
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7. 
75-6-113. Financial institution protection—Setoff—Attachment, gar-
nishment, and other legal process.—(1) Without qualifying any other 
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Warner at the bank? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you remember talking to her on that occasion? 
A Not definitely. 
Q Do you know who she talked with? 
A Not for sure. 
Q And you don't remember anything that took place at 
that time? 
A (Indicating negatively.) 
Q Were you ever advised by Mr. Roach that he had 
talked with Mr. Wilford Youd? 
A Yes. 
Q And when were you so advised? 
A After he talked to him. 
Q When was that? 
A Then, I guess. 
MR. PRATT: What's your best memory of when that 
would have been? 
THE WITNESS: The same time — within the same time 
frame that Garth Youd had been in and cashed certificates. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Before or after? 
A After that. 
Q And how did that conversation come about? 
A I don't know for sure. 
Q But he approached you and told you about the 
23 
conversation? 
A Only — yes. 
Q What did he say? 
A Well, just simply that there had been a problem come 
up about certificates and where I had helped them, Garth, with 
a couple of them, 
Q What did he say specifically to you? 
A I don't know for sure. 
Q Well, he said there had been a problem that came up. 
Did he tell you what the problem was? 
A Only some family — just there was a problem with 
the way we were handling the certificates. 
Q Did he give you instruction? 
A He could have. 
Q Well, did you do anything relative to the time 
certificates of deposit you testified that you reissued to Mr. 
Garth Youd? 
MR. PRATT: If you can recall. 
MR. JOHNSON: Counsel — 
THE WITNESS: Once those certificates had been 
reissued to Mr. Youd, that was over with and done. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) That's what I'm asking you. After 
he says something vague to you about "There's been a problem 
with the Youd time certificates", doesn't he say anything more 
to you about that? 
24 
A There were apparently other certificates. 
Q So did he give you instruction as it related to the 
other certificates? 
A Not that I remember. 
Q Well, did he say, "Don't cash anymore", or, "Talk to 
me", or "Go back and do something with these certificates 
you've issued", anything like that? 
MR. PRATT: Objection as to form. She's already 
said she doesnft remember. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Go ahead and answer the question. 
MR. PRATT: You can if you can answer it. 
THE WITNESS: What was the question again? 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) The question was: After he told 
you about the vague problem, that there was some problem among 
the family, as I understand your testimony, did he tell you 
with regard to the other certificates not to cash them, to 
talk to him, or did he tell you to go back and do something 
with the time certificates of deposit you had apparently 
issued to Mr. Youd? 
MR. PRATT: Object as to form. She's already said 
she doesn't remember. 
Q (BY MR. JOHNSON) Go ahead. 
A Probably to talk to him before anything was done. 
Q But you were not asked to go back and do anything 
with regard to what had already taken place? 
